On 4 June 2025, Ghana’s Parliament passed a controversial bill introducing a one-cedi per litre levy on petroleum products – framed as a necessary intervention to address the ever-growing debt in the energy sector and, ultimately, to end the country’s lingering electricity supply challenges, popularly known as “dumsor.” The ruling NDC government justified the move by pointing fingers at the mismanagement of the previous administration, suggesting that the Energy Sector Recovery Programme had failed to achieve its intended financial restructuring. Now, they argue, it falls upon the public to pay – not for their sins, but for those of their predecessors. The catch? They promise this is the last push, the final Cedi to buy stability. One more sacrifice so we may see the light, literally.
But this move raises deeper questions about Ghana’s fiscal and political architecture, the nature of state-society relations, and the recurring tension between revenue mobilisation and public trust. While on the surface, the D-Levy is merely an energy financing mechanism, at its core, it exemplifies the political economy of managing scarcity, debt, and blame in a fragile democracy. Ghana has been here before. Levies have often emerged as government tools of last resort – temporary solutions that quietly become permanent fiscal burdens. Recall the price stabilisation levy, the sanitation levy, and more recently, the infamous e-levy. Many were billed as short-term interventions. Few were repealed. Even fewer were transparently accounted for.
To understand the deeper dilemma, one must examine the contradiction embedded in this levy. On the one hand, government presents it as an unavoidable necessity – the only path to restructuring the crippling legacy debt owed to Independent Power Producers (IPPs), fuel suppliers, and financiers. On the other, it insists that the cost to consumers will be negligible because the Cedi has recently appreciated, causing a marginal drop in pump prices. This is a risky fiscal narrative. It assumes currency appreciation is stable, and that petroleum product prices are not volatile. But in Ghana, neither is guaranteed. In fact, both are shaped by exogenous global shocks, domestic political risks, and structural vulnerabilities. To peg the justification for a permanent levy to a temporary macroeconomic blip is, at best, politically disingenuous.
Moreover, this levy arrives at a time when the government is trying to demonstrate that it is reversing some of the more unpopular decisions of the previous regime. The removal of the e-levy, a tax on electronic transactions, was lauded as a win for ordinary Ghanaians. But with the new D-Levy, critics argue, the government has merely shifted the burden from the digital economy to the pump. As some have quipped, “E-levy out, Dumsor D-Levy in.” The logic of this substitution is hardly comforting. For many households and informal sector workers, the increase in transport fares triggered by the levy could be more punitive than the e-levy they celebrated seeing repealed. The narrative, then, becomes one of robbing Peter to pay Paul, all under the guise of energy stability.
The political economy implications are profound. First, the D-Levy reinforces a trend in Ghanaian fiscal policy where governments resort to indirect taxes and levies to fund structural inefficiencies, rather than addressing the root causes. These include overcapacity in power generation, misaligned procurement contracts, and opaque financial arrangements with IPPs. Second, it exposes the failure of successive governments to ringfence public funds or build institutional trust. Civil society actors have long complained about the lack of transparency in how energy levies are spent. Audits are sporadic, reports often withheld, and public oversight weak. In this environment, even a well-meaning levy appears predatory.
Finally, this situation raises philosophical questions about who bears the cost of public failure in Ghana. Is it fair to ask today’s citizens to fund yesterday’s poor contracts, bloated power deals, and policy inertia? And if so, where is the evidence that this new stream of revenue will be managed differently? The D-Levy is not just about energy – it is about the moral and institutional legitimacy of governance. It is about the citizen’s role not just as taxpayer, but as shareholder in a public enterprise that seems to suffer from chronic mismanagement. If the goal is to end dumsor, then fiscal tools must be matched with structural reforms, transparency, and a governance model that rewards efficiency rather than excuses it.
In the end, Ghana’s energy future cannot be levied into stability. It must be planned, trusted, and built. A one-cedi solution to a multi-billion dollar governance problem may win a few political points in the short term. But without systemic reform, it risks becoming just another levy in the dark.
Dr. Asiamah's Gazette 